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Abstract—In this paper we propose a trust model based on a
Markov chain in order to formalize the trust metric variation
and its stability in the context of Vehicular Ad hoc Networks
(VANETs). The proposed model takes into account not only
the dynamic trust metric variation according to the vehicles
behaviors, but also the constraints related to the monitoring
process. In our model each vehicle can act as monitor and update
the trust metric of its neighbors according to their behavior in
the network. In addition, our model can be customized through
different parameters like the trust interval and the number of
transitions needed to reach the highest trust level. This flexibility
enables to adapt the model according to the application context.
The performance evaluation of the proposed model is presented
with different parameters and two types of disruptive vehicles are
taken into account: malicious and selfish. The obtained results
show the resistance, the robustness and the incentive of the
proposed model against the fluctuations of the vehicles behaviors.
I. INTRODUCTION
In vehicular environments, the time to react to a given
situation is very critical and a vehicle must be able to ac-
curately check the trust of the received information in real
time. The trust and reputation models [1] are proposed as
new approaches to circumvent with this constraint and to
filter out inaccurate messages and malicious vehicles. Trust
establishment is tagged in many existing research works for
peer to peer, sensors, and mobile ad hoc networks [1] [2].
However, in vehicular environments it is facing tremendous
specific challenges related to their characteristics. In general
vehicular networks do not have any centralized third party.
The only possible communications with infrastructures take
place with Road Side Units (RSUs) which are not deployed
along the roads. Therefore, centralized systems are not suitable
to establish trust in vehicular environments. Furthermore, the
vehicles are traveling with a high speed, consequently, the
communications between the vehicles are short in time and
it is difficult to form an experience history between peers. In
addition, a trust model must be scalable providing the same
achievement independently on the density of vehicles in the
network.
The main existing trust models for VANETs are based on
the verification of vehicles identities and their legitimacy in
the network [3], [4], [5]. They are classified as entity oriented
models such as identity-based systems where the trust metric
is related to the vehicle credentials and its trustworthiness is
static. Other existing trust models are based on a data-oriented
approach. Indeed, in VANETs, when the vehicle introduces a
new information in the network it will be responsible for the
consequences of this information. In this paper, we propose a
new hybrid dynamic trust model combining both approaches:
entity and data oriented. We use a Markov Chain to formalize
the proposed trust model. The goal of this modeling is to take
into account different parameters related to the robustness,
stability and flexibility of the trust model. Unlike static trust
models, we propose a dynamic model based on the monitoring
of the instantaneous vehicles behaviors in the network. The
monitoring process considers the legitimacy of the information
and the cooperation rate of the vehicles. We include also the
constraints related to the efficiency of the monitoring process,
particularly, the probability of false positives and negatives.
Furthermore, our model is fully distributed, the assessment of
vehicles behavior does not require any type of infrastructure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First,
we discuss some existing trust models designed for VANETs.
In section 2, we detail the proposed trust model. Section 3
exposes the simulation results and section 4 concludes the
paper.
II. RELATED WORK
The trust models in VANETs can be classified into three
main types: entity-oriented, data-oriented and hybrid models.
In the entity-oriented trust models the evaluation of the legit-
imacy of an entity is required. In [5], the authors propose a
reputation-based trust model where the vehicles are organized
off-line into groups and each one has a reputation value.
Each group reputation increases if the average of its members
opinion is conform to the road state. It is obvious that this
approach is not resilient against colluding vehicles which
belong to the same group and they broadcast false information
to make the reputation score of their group drive down.
Another shortcoming is the absence of a reputation value for
each vehicle to punish malicious ones. In our proposal, we
remedy to this problem by an instantaneous evaluation of the
vehicles behavior and a malicious vehicle is revoked whenever
2it is detected. In [4], the authors propose a fuzzy approach
to decide whether to accept a warning message or not based
on the trustworthiness of the issuer of the message. In this
model, the authors assume that a vehicle requests from its
neighbors information about the reputation of its peers which
makes a supplementary overhead also this needs additional
time. However, in our proposal each vehicle executes a stand-
alone trust metric evaluation process using the already existing
messages in the network. In the above exposed models, the
trust establishment is related to the verification of the trustwor-
thiness of the entities. However, inaccurate information cannot
be detected without verifying the information itself.
Many research works propose instead, data-oriented trust
models which require the evaluation of the trustworthiness of
the information received in the messages. The authors in [6]
propose a data trust model where the validity of the received
reports about occurred events is inferred by a decision mod-
ule [7] [8] to calculate the posteriori probability of the events.
However, since inference module use the prior probability,
it is not easy to derive it since the high speed. The authors
in [9] proposed an event-based reputation model to filter out
bogus messages. In order to decide about the legitimacy of the
messages, the vehicle observes if the behavior of the reporter
corresponds to the standard behavior result of that event. We
notice that this solution is not realistic because a malicious
vehicle can broadcast a message about an unreal event and
it reacts correspondingly. Nevertheless, data oriented models
seems to be efficient to filter out malicious data that is why
we build our model on. Additionally, we combine it with a
cooperation assessment parameter.
In order to circumvent the shortcoming of the two above
mentioned approaches, the authors proposed in [10], a hybrid
approach using a piggybacking technique. In fact, a trust-
worthiness opinion is appended to each message reporting an
event. The drawback of this proposal is that the first opinion
appended to the message will affect other opinions since
its computing is recursive; it is based on opinion received
in the message. In [12], the authors assume that in the
network there is a set of trusted vehicles called anchors which
broadcast reliable data. The data validation is ensured either
by comparing the received data to other vehicles agreement
or to the data of the anchors. The shortcoming of this model
is that the validation process is accurate only if there is a
sufficient number of reports from other vehicles. The trust
model that we propose is a fully distributed and hybrid
approach based on a monitoring process. We aim to conceive
a flexible model combining many parameters relayed to the
cooperativeness of vehicles in order to detect selfish ones, their
ability to broadcast and forward legitimate information and the
efficiency of the monitoring process.
III. THE ANALYTICAL TRUST MODEL
In this section, we describe our proposed trust model. We
present the states transitions diagram for the Markov chain
model. The model resolution, also the computation of different
transition probabilities are detailed.
A. Trust Model Overview
In the network, we consider that when an event occurs
on the road, all vehicles which are in the vicinity of that
event must broadcast alerts messages reporting it. Furthermore,
vehicles forward all received messages from their neighbors.
We note that the arrival of alert messages to the transmission
queue of vehicles is modeled in the following section.
Our purpose is to establish a dynamic and distributed trust
model where each vehicle called monitor affects a local trust
metric Tm to each vehicle from its neighbors called monitored
vehicle. In fact, the evaluation of the behavior of the monitored
vehicle by the monitor vehicle is based on two main aspects:
the reliability of the message sent by the monitored vehicle
and its cooperation ratio. Thus, according to the outcome of
the monitoring process, the monitored vehicle will have its Tm
increased, decreased or unchanged. Additionally , the Tm can
change to null, and as presented in figure 1, this transition
is weighted by a probability related to the honesty of the
monitored vehicle when it broadcasts the alert messages, also
it depends on the current state of the vehicle.
We model the update process of the Tm at the monitor
vehicle using a discrete-time Markov chain with N +1 states
and a transition matrix P = (Pi,j(t))0≤i,j≤N as represented in
figure 1. Consider a random variable (Xt)t≥0 which represents
the current local Tm corresponding to a given state of a mon-
itored vehicle assigned by a monitor vehicle, the probability
of transition from state i to state j is:
Pi,j(t) = Pr(Xt = j|Xt−1 = i) (1)
The Tm has a value in [0, 1], state 0 is the non trusted state
wherein Tm = 0 and state N is the highest trusted state where
Tm = 1. Each vehicle has an initial trust metric T0 in [0, 1].
The interval [0, 1] is divided into N + 1 states, each one
represents a step of γ (1 mod γ = 0). The values of γ and N are
determined based on the degree of accuracy assessment and
severity towards the Tm of vehicles that we want to achieve
with our model. By using these two parameters we aim to
make our model flexible in the context wherein it is used.
B. States Transition Probabilities
1) One step increasing/decreasing of the Tm: If the current
state is i at time t (Pr(Xt = i) > 0) and the vehicle shows a
positive behavior, its Tm transits to the state i+1 otherwise it
transits to the state i− 1. The positive behavior in our model
is related to: the ability of the vehicle to correctly forward
all received legitimate messages, and to the legitimacy of its
own broadcasted messages. The transitions probabilities are
expressed as follows:
Pi,i+1(t) = pi(t− 1) ∗ pc ∗ pw 0 ≤ i < N
Pi,i−1(t) = pi(t− 1) ∗ (1− pc) ∗ pw 0 < i ≤ N
(2)
Where pi(t) is the probability to be in state i at time t, given
that the initial state is 1, pc is the probability to positively
cooperate in the network, and pw is he probability to correctly
evaluate the received messages. It is expressed as follows:
pw = 1− pe (3)
3Fig. 1. States transitions diagram of the proposed approach
In equation 3, pe is the probability of false positives and
false negatives following the monitoring process [13]. Using
this parameter, we aim to take into account the constraints
related to the nature of the network and to the monitoring in
wireless environments. Indeed, this avoids the over and under
estimation in the monitoring and consequently in the trust level
evaluation. Particularly, pe includes the probability of collusion
while transmitting warning messages and the failure of the
monitored vehicle to access to the transmission channel.
From the transition matrix P, it is possible to compute the
probability to be in state i at time t, pi(t). In fact, given that
the initial state of a vehicle is X0 = 1, the probability for
our Markovian process to be in state k at time tk > 0 is
pk(tk) = P1,k(tk). In addition, the probability to reach state
i at time t > tk given that Xtk = k is Pk,i(t). Therefore, we
can use the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation [11] to compute
the probability pi(t) that a vehicle is in state i at time t:
pi(t) =
∑
k in [1..N ]
P1,k(tk) ∗ Pk,i(t) (4)
In order to evaluate the cooperation of a monitored vehicle,
first, a monitor vehicle calculates a forwarding rate called F .
The forwarding rate F is the number of messages forwarded
by a monitored vehicle divided by the total number of mes-
sages transmitted by the monitor vehicle:
F =
the number of forwarded messages
the total number of transmitted messages
(5)
Secondly, the monitor vehicle calculates the probability that
the monitored vehicle has a positive cooperation in the network
denoted pc as follows:
pc = F ∗ Pm (6)
where Pm is the probability that the monitored vehicle is
not malicious. In fact we use this parameter in order to
evaluate the honesty of the vehicle when transmitting or for-
warding information. Tremendous works exist in the literature
aiming to detect malicious nodes in MANETs [14], [13]and
VANETs [4].
2) State sojourn probability : A vehicle can keep the same
Tm for a certain period of time because either it has no
message in its buffer to forward or it has not detected events
on the road. We consider that the application layer in the
monitored vehicle generates alert messages according to a
Poisson process with a rate λ1. In addition, the monitored
vehicle receives alert messages from other vehicles according
to a Poisson process with a rate λ2 ≥ λ1. We suppose that a
message needs the period ts to be treated in the higher layer
before being sent, so we assume that the time required for the
treatment of messages is exponential with a rate 1/ts. Then,
according to [16], the probability Pq that the transmission
queue is empty is:
Pq = 1−
1− (1− θ)θB
1− θ(B+1)
(7)
θ = (λ1 + λ2) ∗ ts (8)
Where B is the size of the transmission queue and we assume
that λ1,λ2 and ts have the same values for all vehicles. Thus,
from equation 7 we deduce the probability that a node sojourns
in state i, Pi,i (i 6= N ):
Pi,i(t) = pi(t− 1) ∗ Pq (9)
3) Trusted state sojourn Probability: The vehicle keeps
the trusted state N (Tm = 1) either because it positively
cooperates as discussed above or it has no messages in
its transmission queue. We express PN,N the probability to
sojourn in state N as follows:
PN,N (t) = pN (t− 1) ∗ (pc ∗ pw + Pq) (10)
Yet, the trusted vehicles are also monitored by their neighbors
in order to avoid that they benefit from the trusted state and
behave maliciously or selfishly in the network.
4) Transition to the non trusted state: As we mentioned
above, the monitor vehicle assesses both the cooperativeness of
the monitored vehicle and the legitimacy of the information it
broadcasts. Thus, according to the outcome of the monitoring
process, the Tm of the monitored vehicle can nullify with a
given probability that reflects the legitimacy of its broadcasted
messages. The probability of this transition is related to the
current state of the vehicle and to its honesty represented
by Pm. Logically, if a vehicle reaches a high Tm, this
means that it is almost honest as expressed by equation (6).
However, a malicious vehicle can behave honestly to reach
the highest trust level and then it tries to benefit from its
state and to broadcast false information. Thus, we consider
this transition in order to detect such a malicious behavior
4known as camouflage attack. The probability that the vehicle
transits to state 0 is calculated as follows:
pi,0(t) = pi(t− 1) ∗ (1− Pm) (11)
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Analytical Results
In order to validate our trust model we consider a Markov
chain as represented in figure 1 with N = 10 states. Each one
represents a step γ = 0.1. The initial trust metric for each
vehicle is Tm = 0.1. We conducted a set of preliminary tests
in order to investigate the convergence and the persistence
of the proposed approach as function of different parameters.
Furthermore, we study the resilience of the model against some
misbehaving scenarios.
1) Convergence of the Tm: We investigate the convergence
of our model, particularly we are interested on the required
time and the needed conditions for a vehicle to reach the
trusted state where Tm=1 and to remain in. To this end, we plot
the probability to get Tm = 1 that we call the trustworthiness
of a vehicle, as function of the time, the forwarding rate F and
Pm. We set parameters pe to 0.20 as computed in [13] and
Pq to 0.25.
We notice from figures 2a and 2b that for time units less
than 10, P (Tm = 1) is equal to 0 because a vehicle starts
from Tm = 0.1 and it must pass by all states from 1 to
N = 10, then the vehicle needs at least 10 time units to
reach Tm = 1. After, the P (Tm = 1) incessantly grows until
reaching a maximum in the 14th time unit. Regarding the
attenuation of P (Tm = 1) after reaching the maximum in
figure 2a, we explain this behavior by the cumulating effect
of Pm. If the vehicle does not improve its behavior related
to Pm, the probability to reach Tm = 1 decreases. However,
in figure 2b where Pm = 1, when P (Tm = 1) reaches 1 it
does not attenuate as for the previous case where Pm < 1.
This result confirms our explanation for the attenuation in the
previous plot, also this result points out the sensibility of the
trustworthiness to the parameter Pm. In addition, we remark
in both plots that for small values of F (0.35 and 0.45) the
drop of P (Tm = 1) is less rapid compared to higher values
of F (0.90 and 1.00), however it is obvious that P (Tm = 1)
is less important. Hence, if a vehicle reaches the trusted state
with a legal behavior and a full cooperation, it keeps its trust
state.
We conclude that the trustworthiness is getting higher for
high values of the forwarding rate F. However, the persistence
in the trusted state strongly depends on the behavior of the
vehicle expressed by Pm. The more positively the vehicle
cooperates, the more chance it has to be trusted, and the longer
it keeps its trusted state.
2) Impact of a disruptive behavior: Let us now study the
ability of our trust model to handle dynamic behaviors of the
vehicles. In general, a disruptive vehicle divides its behavior
into two parts: in the first part it positively participates in the
network in order to reach the highest trust level. However, in
the second part it changes its positive behavior to negative one
in order to benefit from the reached trust level to attack the
network. In this study, we focus on two main scenarios.
Scenario 1: : When a vehicle reaches the highest trust
level, it will act selfishly by reducing its forwarding rate F in
order to keep its throughput only for its own data transmission.
The vehicle shows a good behavior (Pm=1 and F=1) for the
first 20 time units to build up its Tm. Then it proceeds with a
disruptive behavior following a pattern of bad behavior where
it degrades its forwarding rate for 10 time units followed
by a good behavior for 10 time units and so on. From the
plot of figure 3, we notice that P(Tm=1) brutally decreases
with the first misbehave time unit (21th). Along the period
the vehicle does not cooperate, its trustworthiness grows
slowly because it is not acting maliciously in the network
and it continues to transmits its own messages (λ1 6= 0).
Once the monitored vehicle restores its cooperation rate, its
trustworthiness resumes to the old value. We remark also
that when the degradation decreases, the vehicle finds its
previous trustworthiness level more rapidly. The difference
in the fall of the trustworthiness between the curves proves
that the trustworthiness of the vehicles strongly depends on
its cooperation quality (pc). This result proves that our model
reacts rapidly and accurately to the change in the behavior
of vehicles. It points out that our trust model is dynamic
unlike static models where the trustworthiness is not sensible
to behavior changes.
Scenario 2: : We consider a disruptive vehicle which
shows a good behavior (Pm=1) for the first 20 times units to
build up its Tm and then it proceeds with a disruptive behavior
with Pm=0.45 as plotted in figure 4, giving a pattern of a
bad behavior for 10 times units followed by a good behavior
for 10 time units and so on. From the plot of figure 4, the
trustworthiness decreases at the first misbehaving time unit.
Once again, we notice the high sensibility of the proposed
model to the parameter Pm which reflects the honesty of
the vehicles. When the vehicle resumes its good behavior
(Pm = 1), it doesn’t restore its first trusted state and its
trustworthiness increases slightly up to only 0.18 in figure 4.
The same behavior of curves is repeated for the following
steps until time unit 80.
There are two conclusions that can be derived from analyzing
the results. First, if a vehicle proves a malicious behavior even
for a short period of time, this affects its trustworthiness on the
network and it is difficult to restore the trusted state. Secondly,
we deduce that the proposed model is incentive. Indeed, the
vehicle must be neither selfish nor malicious not only to reach
the trusted state but also to remain in.
B. Simulation Results
We study in this section, the feasibility of our trust model
in high mobility environments. Specifically, we investigate the
convergence of the trust metric in such environments and we
focus on the followed reasoning to decide different parameters
used in our proposed trust model particularly, the number of
states N and transition step γ. To this end, we conducted a
set of tests using the simulator Veins [15] considering two
50 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
The probability of Tm=1 (Pm=0.80)
time units
P
(T
m
=
1
)
F=0.35
F=0.45
F=0.60
F=0.70
F=0.90
F=1.0
(a) Pm = 0.80
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
time units
P
(T
m
=
1
)
The probability of Tm=1 (Pm=1)
F=0.35
F=0.45
F=0.60
F=0.70
F=0.90
F=1.00
(b) Pm = 1.0
Fig. 2. The trustworthiness of the vehicle versus the time with different Pm
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Time units
P
(T
m
=
1
)
F=75
F=50
F=0.25
F=0
F=1 F<1
Fig. 3. Model reaction face to a disruptive behavior -Scenario 1, Pm = 1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Time units
P
(T
m
=
1
)
F=0.25
F=0.50
F=0.75
F=1.00
Pm=0.45Pm=1
Fig. 4. Model reaction face to a disruptive behavior -Scenario 2
vehicular models: a Urban model and a highway. Vehicles
travel with a maximum speed of 15m/s and 25m/s for the
urban model and the highway, respectively. In the highway
model, all vehicles are traveling towards the same direction.
However, in the urban model the vehicles passes by multiple
crosses and they can change the direction at any time there
are in a cross. The arrival of vehicles in the road is a Poisson
process with a rate of 2 vehicles per one second.
We plot in figures 5a and 5b the average number of vehicles
encountered along a trip per one vehicle and the average
encounter duration between two vehicles. From figure 5a,
we remark that in the highway model, the average number
of encountered vehicles is more important than the urban
model. This is essentially due to the high speed of vehicles
which makes the neighborhood change frequently in highway
compared to the urban model. This is an important recommen-
dation for our trust model. In fact, a vehicle will not travel
isolated in the network and this augments the likelihood that
its behavior is monitored.
According to the proposed model, the trust metric is evalu-
ated each time the monitor receives a message from the mon-
itored vehicle. Thus the time units expected in figures 2a and
2b correspond to the average time period between two evalu-
ations of the trusted metric that we call iteration duration.
It relies on the inter arrivals time of the messages from the
monitored to the monitor and the average time required to
assess F and pc by the monitor vehicle. Hence, if the vehicle
proves a legitimate behavior (F = 1 and Pm = 1), it needs
only a time period of N*iteration duration to have its
Tm = 1. It is the minimal required convergence time of the
trust metric. From figure 5b, the average encounter duration in
the highway model is higher than urban model, it reaches 100s.
However, in the urban model, the average encounter duration
is less than 60s. We plot in figure 5c, the maximal and minimal
time for the trust metric convergence for both urban and high-
way model. For the minimal convergence time we consider
different iteration duration: 2s, 3s and 5s and N=10 states.
The goal is to investigate if the average encounter duration
guarantees the convergence of the trust metric to the trusted
state. As depicted in figure 5c, we remark that the maximal
encounter duration in the urban model insures the convergence
for N=10, only for iteration duration < 5s. We deduce that
in case where the network traffic is reduced in the urban model,
the number of states N can be reduced to quickly reach the
convergence to the trusted state. However, we remark that for
the highway scenario, the encounter duration guarantees the
convergence even for limited traffic of messages. Hence, in
this model our trust model can be executed with N higher
than 10 states. Thus, from the analysis of above results, we
conclude that our model is highly adaptive to applications.
Indeed, the different parameters values are constrained by the
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context where the trust model is processed, particularly the
speed, the duration of encounter between vehicles and the
network traffic.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a dynamic and distributed trust
model aiming at establishing a trust relationship between
vehicles and filtering out malicious and selfish vehicles. This
trust model is formalized by Markov chain used to stress
the trust evolution system, to introduce different parameters
and to make it flexible. The monitoring process is based on
the assessment of the cooperativeness of a vehicle also its
honesty while broadcasting alert messages. In addition, the
proposed model has a set of characteristics. It is incentive
because it incites the vehicles to positively act in the network
without adopting the selfish or the malicious behaviors in order
to keep their reached trust level. It is robust because it is
able to detect the different malicious behaviors. It is flexible
because it presents different customized parameters like the
trust interval and the number of transitions needed to reach
the highest trust level. We conducted a set of simulations
to investigate the performances of our trust model and to
point out the reaction of our model to behavior changes. The
obtained results illustrate the positive reaction of the model
face to disruptive behaviors. In our future work, we are aiming
at enhancing the performance evaluation of our trust model in
real context of VANETs and we will extend our model in order
to manage global trust metric where each vehicle has only one
Tm known by all its neighbors.
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